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Abstract
If entitlement to UI bene￿ts must be earned with employment, generous UI is
an additional bene￿t to an employment relationship, so it promotes job creation. If
individuals are risk neutral, UI is fairly priced, and the UI system prevents moral-
hazard, the generosity of UI has no e⁄ect on unemployment. As with Ricardian
Equivalence, this result should be useful to pinpoint the e⁄ects of UI to violation
of its premises. In itself, the endogenous entitlement of UI bene￿ts does not resolve
if the Mortensen-Pissarides model is able to generate realistic cycles. However, it
brings some insights into this debate: The widespread concern in the design of
UI systems to minimize moral-hazard unemployment only makes sense if workers
have su¢ ciently high values of leisure (80 percent of labor productivity in our
baseline calculation for the United States). Also, the fact that the generosity of
UI has potentially a small e⁄ect on unemployment reconciles a high response of
unemployment to changes in labor productivity with a small response to changes
in UI bene￿ts.
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11 Introduction
Most models of employment ￿ ows in the labor market assume that workers automat-
ically qualify for unemployment insurance (UI) bene￿ts while they are searching for a
job. As pointed out by Mortensen (1977), Burdett (1979), and Hamermesh (1979), this
simplistic view of how a UI system operates may lead to highly misleading conclusions
about its impact on the labor market. To avoid this criticism, several papers taking into
account more realistic features of the UI systems have emerged. However, because of the
institutional complexities of actual UI systems, these models rely exclusively on numeri-
cal methods for their analyses, and, they either assume an exogenous distribution of real
wages (Andolfatto and Gomme, 1996) or a non-standard mechanism for its determination
(Brown and Ferrall, 2003). In this paper, we advance an analytically tractable version
of the standard Mortensen-Pissarides search and matching model in which workers are
not always entitled to UI bene￿ts because such an entitlement must be earned with prior
and not too distant employment, and it can be lost if workers quit their jobs voluntarily
or refuse job o⁄ers.
If UI bene￿ts are unconditionally received while searching for a job, they represent an
opportunity cost of employment, and improve the bargaining position of workers while
negotiating over wages with their employers. As a result, UI bene￿ts reduce the expected
pro￿ts of ￿lling a vacancy, and hurt ￿rms￿incentives for job creation and therefore em-
ployment. In contrast, if UI bene￿ts are conditional on prior employment, they are no
longer an opportunity cost, but an indirect bene￿t of employment. True enough, once
workers become eligible for UI their bargaining position improves and so their salaries
rise. However, this is well anticipated by all involved, so UI bene￿ts reinforce the bargain-
ing position of ￿rms dealing with workers who are not yet eligible for UI. Consequently,
UI bene￿ts promote the value of ￿lling a vacancy and stimulate job creation. This is the
entitlement e⁄ect stressed by Mortensen (1977), Burdett (1979), and Hamermesh (1979)
but operating through a new channel. In those papers, the desire to earn UI entitlement
reduces the reservation wages of workers searching for jobs, which in turn reduces unem-
ployment. In our model, the entitlement e⁄ect operates through the bargaining positions
2of ￿rms and workers. The UI bene￿ts, making the employment match more attractive
to workers, enable ￿rms to appropriate a larger fraction of the match surplus, which
translates into a stronger incentive to post vacancies.
Even if generous UI bene￿ts encourage job creation, they may hurt employment when
we take into account the ￿nancial costs of the UI system. When the UI program is
funded by the UI contribution fees paid by employed workers, a generous UI system is
also an expensive one, and the large fees needed to maintain it lower the workers￿desire
of being employed, and so the value of ￿lling a vacancy. Therefore, an expensive UI
system imposes a downward pressure on employment. Based on these two competing
e⁄ects of UI bene￿ts, we obtain the following analog to Ricardian Equivalence: If UI
rules can prevent the moral hazard behavior of becoming or remaining unemployed, each
employed worker is charged a fair unemployment insurance fee, and utilities are linear,
then the generosity of UI bene￿ts, the duration of these bene￿ts, and the time it takes to
become eligible for UI are all irrelevant to the determination of output, vacancies, and
unemployment.
Like Ricardian Equivalence, this irrelevance result should be a useful benchmark to
pinpoint the economic e⁄ects of a UI system as violations of its premises. That is, the
economic relevance of a UI system must be found on the risk aversion of workers, the
"unfair" pricing of UI services, and moral hazard. If workers are risk averse, UI provides
the valuable service of smoothing consumption ￿ uctuations in the presence of employ-
ment shocks. The Mortensen-Pissarides model typically abstracts from this purpose by
assuming linear utilities, and we follow this tradition in this paper. If UI contributions, or
equivalently taxes that ultimately fall on employed workers, do not match the expected
present discounted value of the UI bene￿ts to be received during unemployment spells,
the entitlement e⁄ect of UI bene￿ts does not o⁄set the opportunity cost of ￿nancing
these bene￿ts. So, the UI system may either increase or decrease employment depending
on if the insured workers in question are subsidized or not from other sources of govern-
ment revenue. Finally, workers may alter the hazard of being or remaining unemployed
by changing their search intensity, refusing job o⁄ers, or strategically quitting jobs once
3they are eligible for UI. In a balance between tractability and realism, the present contri-
bution focuses on the third of these hazard; that is, the assumptions of the model allow
for moral hazard quits, but abstract from the e⁄ect of UI on search intensity and the
acceptance of job o⁄ers.
The possibility of moral hazard quits opens the door to an interesting form of multiple
equilibria. For a generic set of parameters values, two types of equilibria coexist: A
"good" equilibrium where workers do not quit once they are eligible for UI and a "bad"
equilibrium where such quits occur. In the good equilibrium, few workers collect UI
bene￿ts and many are employed, so the UI contributions required to ￿nance the UI
program can be low, which in turn makes it undesirable to quit a job to collect UI
bene￿ts. In the bad equilibrium, many workers collect UI and few contribute to the UI
system. Hence, UI contributions need to be high, which induces workers to quit as soon
as they can collect UI. This multiplicity of equilibria is a reminder that fully rating UI
contributions is not enough to curtail the moral hazards induced by a UI system.
When our model is confronted with data from Canada and the United States, it o⁄ers
the following insights on the current debate about the appropriateness of the Mortensen-
Pissarides model in explaining the cyclical ￿ uctuations in the labor market. First, the
eligibility rules of these two countries show a major concern to avoid moral hazard quits
and such concern is only meaningful if the value of leisure is not too low. For example,
in our baseline calibration with United States data, we calculate that for values of leisure
below 80 percent of labor productivity, workers would never quit to collect UI even if
they knew they would be able to collect the statutory UI replacement rate (40 percent)
with probability one. Hence, even if the obvious political and social concern about un-
employment implies that the value of leisure cannot be close to labor productivity (see
Mortensen and NagypÆl, 2007), the further concern to avoid moral hazard unemployment
implies that the value of leisure cannot be too low either. Second, our calibrations of the
model to cyclical data from Canada and the United States require similar values of leisure
as a percentage of labor productivity (around 54 percent) even if the levels of generosity
of UI systems in these two countries are quite di⁄erent. Third, with su¢ ciently high val-
4ues of leisure, our calibrations are able to generate realistically large labor market cycles
in response to productivity shocks, even if unemployment responds little to correlated
changes in taxes and UI bene￿ts.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our stochastic version
of the Mortensen-Pissarides model with a UI system in which individuals need to earn
their UI eligibility. Section 3 analyzes a deterministic version of the model. Section 4 ￿ts
the model to data on the labor market cycles in Canada and the United States. Finally,
section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
Our model is a stochastic version of Pissarides (1985) search model. To simplify algebraic
expressions, we use continuous time in the analysis of this and the following section,
although a discrete time version of the same model will be employed in the numerical
simulations of Section 4.
2.1 Basic Environment
In the economy, there is a continuum of measure one of workers, and a large measure
of potential ￿rms with free entry into the labor market. Both workers and ￿rms are
in￿nitely lived, risk neutral, maximize their expected utilities, and discount future utility
￿ ows at the common rate r: Production requires the cooperation of one worker and one
￿rm. For this cooperation to take place, workers and ￿rms must ￿rst enter the labor
market and search for a suitable partner. Once a match has been formed, it produces a
￿ ow of output p until it breaks down. The productivity p; common to all matches in the
economy, follows a Markov jump stochastic process with a constant arrival rate ￿ and
takes values in a ￿nite support P 2 Rn
+: The surplus from a match is split between the
two parties according to the generalized axioms of Nash. Finally, employment matches
dissolve either exogenously as a result of separations which come at an arrival rate s; or
endogenously if breaking the match is in the interest of one of the two parties.
5The key feature we introduce to this standard environment is that workers do not
always collect unemployment insurance bene￿ts (UI) while they are searching for jobs.
For workers to be eligible for UI, they must ￿rst be employed for a while, and bene￿ts
do not last forever. Furthermore, UI bene￿ts are meant to be collected for workers who
lose their jobs involuntarily, although, to be realistic, we allow some workers who quit to
successfully pretend to have lost their jobs involuntarily.
To capture these features in a tractable way, the following assumptions are made.
Newly employed workers are not eligible for UI, and eligibility is the outcome of a jump
stochastic process with an arrival rate g: Eligible workers always collect UI if they su⁄er
an exogenous separation from their jobs, but if they quit, they collect UI with probability
￿ 2 [0;1]. Finally, unemployed workers collecting UI lose eligibility either when they are
o⁄ered a job or as a result of a jump stochastic process with an arrival rate d:
Unemployment insurance is provided by a government, which ￿nances the UI system
with a mandatory state dependent contribution fee ￿p collected from all employed workers.
Since the government can borrow and save at the interest rate r; the UI program can run
de￿cits or surpluses over time. Later on, we will allow for permanent de￿cits or surpluses
by introducing general taxation and a public good.
All workers are identical in terms of preferences and abilities, and supply labor inelas-
tically. The only di⁄erence across workers lies in the UI eligibility, which is indicated by





1; if the worker is eligible for UI, and
0; otherwise.
Net of the UI contribution fee, employed workers earn a state dependent wage rate wi
p,
where the superscript i denotes the UI eligibility state, and the subscript p denotes the
productivity state. The wage rate wi
p depends on UI eligibility because UI bene￿ts raise
the opportunity cost of employment, so they improve the worker￿ s bargaining position in
the negotiations to split the match surplus. Unemployed workers receive a ￿ ow utility
from leisure ‘; and, if eligible for UI, they also receive UI bene￿ts b. To avoid uninteresting
6possibilities, both ‘ and b are assumed to be positive, and ‘ is assumed smaller than the
production in a match net of the UI contribution fee: ‘ < p ￿ ￿p for all p 2 P: However,
the total opportunity cost of employment for a worker who is entitled to collect UI, ‘+b;
may surpass production net of the UI fee for some realizations of p, which raises the
possibility of moral hazard quits.
All ￿rms possess the same production technology and preferences. Each one of them
chooses to either stay idle or be active in the labor market. An active ￿rm searching for
a worker posts a vacancy at a constant ￿ ow cost c, and an active ￿rm paired up with a
worker gains an output ￿ ow p and incurs a labor cost wi
p + ￿p: In addition to the ￿ ow
costs of posting vacancies, we follow Mortensen and NagypÆl (2007)1 in assuming that
there is a one time hiring and training cost k (training cost for short) when a worker
and a ￿rm meet. We assume that this cost is transferable, and split between the two
parties by the same type of generalized Nash bargaining as in the wage negotiations. As
a result, a ￿rm and a worker end up incurring the respective costs kf and kw to start an
employment relationship. This cost captures in a simpli￿ed fashion the fact that ￿rms
incur hiring and trainings costs when they recruit new employees, and workers typically
su⁄er human capital losses when they undergo a spell of unemployment. Although most
properties of our model do not depend on k being strictly positive, we believe that a
successful numerical implementation of the model requires taking into account the full
labor turnover costs.
The search frictions in the labor market are characterized by a constant returns to
scale matching technology: M (v;u): The function M maps vacancies posted v and un-
employment u onto the number of successful matches formed. Let ￿ be the vacancy-
unemployment ratio (v=u, also called market tightness): The constant returns to scale of
M implies that the rate at which workers ￿nd jobs (￿nding rate) is just a function of













1The importance of training costs, or more generally turnover costs, for the dynamics of unemployment
was earlier emphasized by Braun (2005), NagypÆl (2005), Silva and Toledo (2005), and Yashiv (2005).
7The function M is assumed continuously di⁄erentiable, increasing in both arguments, and
concave. Furthermore, it satis￿es the terminal conditions: M (1;0) = M (0;1) = 0, and
M1 (0;1) = M2 (1;0) = 1. Therefore, workers ￿nd it easier to ￿nd jobs when vacancies
are abundant relative to unemployment (in booms), while ￿rms ￿nd it easier to ￿ll their
vacancies when the reverse is true (in recessions).
2.2 Bellman Equations
Workers may be in four possible states depending on whether they are employed or not
and whether they are eligible for UI bene￿ts or not. Analogously, ￿rms paired with
a worker may be in two possible states depending on the worker￿ s UI eligibility state.
Contingent on productivity being p; let the values of being an employed worker and an
unemployed worker, respectively, be W i
p and Ui
p, where superscript i denotes the worker￿ s
UI eligibility state: Similarly, let the values of a ￿rm matched with a worker with UI
eligibility state i be Ji
p. Finally, when the economy experiences a productivity change
(p ! p0), let the expression EpXi
p0 denote the expected value of X (W; U; or J) conditional
on p. Using this notation, the utility values W i
p; Ui
p; and Ji
p for i = 0;1 are recursively
determined by the following Bellman equations.
The value of an unemployed worker who does not collect UI is the present discounted
value of the utility from leisure plus the expected gains from transitions to employment,
which comes with an arrival rate f (￿p); or to a di⁄erent productivity state, which comes
with arrival rate ￿. When a transition to employment happens, the worker incurs the
training costs kw :
rU
0










The analog equation for the value of an unemployed worker collecting UI includes the
present discounted value of the utility from both leisure and UI bene￿ts and the expected
gains or losses from transitions to employment, UI ineligibility, and a di⁄erent produc-
8tivity state. These transitions come at the arrival rates f (￿p); d; and ￿; respectively:
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The value of an employed worker ineligible for UI is the present discounted value
of wages plus the expected gains or losses associated with exogenously losing the job,
becoming eligible for UI, and experiencing a productivity change. The arrival rates of


























A worker eligible for UI can choose to quit the job to collect UI with probability ￿
instead of continuing with the match. The ￿ ow utilities attained with these two choices



























Upon quitting, the worker gets the expected utility of being unemployed, otherwise the
worker gets the wage plus the expected capital gains or losses associated with losing the
job exogenously or experiencing a transition to a di⁄erent productivity.
Because of free entry, the value of an unmatched ￿rm is zero. The value of a ￿rm
employing a worker is the present discounted value of current pro￿ts plus the expected
gains or losses associated with the worker becoming eligible for UI, the match exogenously
dissolving, and productivity changing, which occur with arrival rates g; s; and ￿. At any
time, a ￿rm can terminate the match, so the values of a matched ￿rm cannot be negative.
Given our assumptions, the value of a ￿rm employing a worker ineligible for UI is always
positive,2 but the same cannot be assured if the worker is eligible for UI. Consequently,
rJ
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2As proven in Proposition 1, V 0

















Unmatched ￿rms do not post vacancies if there are no expected gains in ￿lling them,
so ￿p = 0 if J0
p ￿ kf ￿ 0: Otherwise, unmatched ￿rms post vacancies until the ￿ ow costs
of posting a vacancy is equal to the expected gains of ￿lling it, which occurs with an




: Using (1) and f(￿p) ￿ 0; these two relations
can be summarized as follows:







Since we abstract from the possibility of workers carrying UI eligibility earned from
past employment to a new job, ￿rms get the same value from matching with a worker
who is collecting UI as one who is not. Hence, it is consistent to assume that there is a
single labor market where all workers and all ￿rms interact. We leave the complexities
derived from a dual labor market that di⁄erentiates workers depending on if they are
eligible for UI or not to future research.
2.3 Nash Bargaining
The surplus of an employment match depends on the worker￿ s entitlement to receive UI











If the worker is eligible for UI, the match surplus depends on if the potential dissolution
would be considered a quit or not by the UI agency. Because the agency imperfectly
monitors why employment separations occur, we assume that if a match were to break
down while bargaining, the worker would be able to collect UI with probability ￿. This
is the same probability of collecting UI after a voluntary quit because a worker who quits
can be considered as one who cannot successfully negotiate a suitable pay raise. This
assumption implies that the worker￿ s opportunity cost of employment is (1 ￿ ￿)U0
p +￿U1
p:












The generalized Nash solution to the bargaining problem maximizes the weighted






p)￿; where i takes
values 1 or 0 depending on the UI eligibility state, and ￿ denotes the worker￿ s bargaining
power. The solution to this problem leads to the familiar sharing rule:
J
i
p = (1 ￿ ￿)V
i
p; for i = 0;1: (11)
Similarly, when a ￿rm and a worker ￿rst meet, the surpluses of both parties must subtract











; for i = 0;1: (12)
The combination of (11) and (12), together with kf + kw = k; results in the following
split of the training costs:
k
f = (1 ￿ ￿)k; and k
w = ￿k: (13)
2.4 Equilibrium










p ; V 1
p that satisfy the Bellman equations (2) to (7), the free entry condition
(8), the match surplus de￿nitions (9) and (10), and the Nash bargaining solutions (11) to
(13). This system of equations can be reduced to the following four functional equations
(see the Appendix):








b + ￿(Ep ^ Up0 ￿ ^ Up)
r + d + f (￿p)
; (15)
^ Bp = max
(
s^ Up + ￿(Ep ^ Bp0 ￿ ^ Bp)
r + s + g













+ g ^ Bp ￿ ￿p + ￿(EpV 0




Equation (14) is just the free entry condition (8) combined with the Nash bargaining
rules (11) to (13). Equation (15) states that the value of UI eligibility for an unemployed
worker, ^ Up ￿ U1
p ￿U0
p; is equal to the expected present discounted value of the UI bene￿ts
received by an eligible worker during a spell of unemployment. Equation (16) calculates
the incremental value of achieving UI eligibility, which depends on if the match breaks
down or not because of such eligibility. If the match survives UI eligibility (￿rst term in
16), ^ Bp is the di⁄erence between the expected present discounted values of the UI bene￿ts
to be received upon an exogenous separation of the current match if the worker is eligible























If UI eligibility kills the employment match (second term in 16), then ^ Bp is the expected
value of UI eligibility for an unemployed worker minus the value of the match. Finally,
equation (17) states that the value of the match between a ￿rm and a worker ineligible
for UI is the expected present discounted value of the bene￿ts resulting from the match.
These bene￿ts include the labor productivity net of both the value of leisure and the work-






the net bene￿ts from the UI system, g ^ Bp￿￿p; and the expected gains from a productivity
change, ￿(EpV 0
p0 ￿V 0
p ). Notice that the UI contribution ￿p detracts from the value of the
match exactly in the same way as the value of leisure does, but UI bene￿ts have exactly
the opposite e⁄ect. This implies that instead of reducing the value of a match, UI bene￿ts
make the match more attractive at least before workers become eligible to collect them.
12The equilibrium functions ￿p; ^ Up; ^ Bp; and V 0
p solve (14) to (17), and the remaining
functions that de￿ne an equilibrium follow recursively from these four. The following
proposition establishes the existence and some basic properties of an equilibrium.
Proposition 1: An equilibrium exists and has the following properties:
U1
p > U0
p and V 0
p > 0 for all p 2 P: Furthermore, if ￿ ￿ s=(r + s + g + ￿);
then V 1
p > 0 for all p 2 P: (see the proof in the Appendix).
As one would expect, an unemployed worker bene￿ts from being eligible for UI, and
the match surplus is always positive if the worker is not eligible for UI. Also, if the
probability of collecting UI is low when a worker eligible for UI quits a job, then the match
surplus remains positive once eligibility is achieved. The following two propositions state
additional properties of this equilibrium.
Proposition 2: If workers are always denied bene￿ts after quitting a job
voluntarily (￿ = 0) and the UI system is fully funded by UI contribution fees
(each worker is charged the expected present discounted value of expected UI
bene￿ts), then the level of UI bene￿ts, the duration of these bene￿ts, and the
time it takes to become eligible for UI are irrelevant for the determination
of output, vacancies, and unemployment. In particular, the introduction or
elimination of a fully funded UI system with ￿ = 0 has no e⁄ect on these
variables.
Proof: Since ￿ = 0; moral hazard quits never occur. Consequently, the expected present
discounted value of UI contributions from a newly employed worker is:
Tp =
￿p + ￿(EpTp0 ￿ Tp)
r + s
: (20)
For the UI system to be fully funded, Tp must be equal to B0
p: Comparison of (19) and
(20) implies that this equality holds if and only if ￿p = g ^ Bp: So, (17) implies that V 0
p is
13independent of b; d; and g: Therefore, neither ￿p; nor output, unemployment, or vacancies
depends on these variables.
Proposition 3: As long as there are no moral hazard quits, the equilib-
rium paths of vacancies and unemployment are independent of the probability
of collecting UI after quitting a job voluntarily.
Proof: Workers have no incentive to quit after they become eligible for UI if and only if
the ￿rst argument in the max operator in (16) does not fall short of the second one, and
if this holds for all p 2 P; ￿ drops out from the system of equations (14) to (17), which
determines ￿p and so output, unemployment, and vacancies.
Propositions 2 and 3 taken together provide a set of conditions that render a UI
system irrelevant. Like other irrelevance results, such as Ricardian Equivalence, these
propositions should be useful to pin point the economic e⁄ects of a UI system as violations
from their stated premises. In this vein, the e⁄ects of a UI system have to be found in
incorrectly pricing its insurance services, moral hazard, and risk aversion. More precisely,
the adverse e⁄ects of UI program on output and employment have to be found either in
the way it is ￿nanced, which may distort job creation, or in the rules for the provision
of bene￿ts, which may engender strategic behavior such as quitting once eligibility is
achieved or not searching while bene￿ts last. Also, with risk aversion, the bene￿ts of
reducing income uncertainty with UI bene￿ts a⁄ect the willingness to work and save in
ways that are beyond the scope of the present contribution.
3 Deterministic Equilibrium
To obtain sharp results, this section follows Shimer (2005) and Mortensen and NagypÆl
(2007) and analyzes the special case where p is deterministic. As argued by Mortensen
and NagypÆl (2007), the comparative statics analysis of this deterministic model provides
a good approximation for the dynamics of the stochastic model if productivity shocks are
rare ￿ ! 0;or they occur frequently but their changes are small.
14As we will see, the predictions of how the economy reacts to shocks, such as a rise
in productivity or an increased generosity of UI bene￿ts, depends crucially on the as-
sumptions we make about the UI contribution fee ￿: On one extreme, we can assume
that ￿ is an endogenous variable that adjusts to maintain the UI system fully funded.
On the other extreme, we can assume that ￿ is an exogenous parameter not a⁄ected by
the shocks considered. For this second assumption to be logically consistent in a general
equilibrium context, we need to extend the model and assume that ￿ includes both UI
contributions and general taxes, and that the government provides a public good, which
yields separate utility. With this extension, when ￿ is kept constant while other parame-
ters change, we are implicitly assuming that the government adjusts the provision of the
public good endogenously to balance its budget.
3.1 Exogenous ￿
With the simpli￿cation that p is deterministic, the system of equations (14) to (17) that
characterizes an equilibrium can be reduced to the crossing of the two schedules depicted
in Figure 1. These schedules relate the value of a newly formed match V 0 with the
vacancy-unemployment rate ￿ as follows. Schedule JC (job creation) represents the free
entry condition (14). Its upward sloping shape captures that ￿rms respond to a rise in the
expected pro￿ts associated with a rise in V 0 by posting more vacancies until the ￿lling
rate becomes su¢ ciently low so that the value of posting a vacancy falls back to zero.
Schedule MV (match value) is the representation of the mapping from ￿ to V 0 implied by
the remaining equilibrium equations (15) to (17). Using (14), the absence of productivity
shocks and the equilibrium properties that V 0 > 0, these equations simplify into:
^ U =
b
r + d + f (￿)
; (21)
^ B = max
(
s^ U
r + s + g






p ￿ ‘ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿1 c￿ + g ^ B
r + s
: (23)
15Equation (23) implies that there are two reasons why the value of a match V 0 falls with ￿
as represented in Figure 1. First, as indicated by ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿1 c￿; workers ￿nd jobs easier if
there are more vacancies posted, which pulls up the wage due to the improved bargaining
power and lowers the match surplus. Second, as captured by g ^ B; the expected present
discounted value of the UI bene￿ts received by an eligible worker in (21) falls with the job
￿nding rate and so with ￿: As a result, the value of the jobs needed to gain this eligibility
falls as well.
Figure 1 is useful to analyze the qualitative implications of the model. For example,
an increase in training costs k shifts the JC schedule up (￿rms post less vacancies), so it
leads to a rise in V 0 and a fall in ￿: In contrast, an increase in labor productivity or a fall
in the value of leisure shift the MV schedule up (matches become more valuable), so both
V 0 and ￿ increase. A more generous provision of UI bene￿ts (a rise in b or g; or a fall in d)
also shifts the MV schedule up because the matches that would make workers eligible for
UI bene￿ts become more valuable. Meanwhile, a more expensive UI contribution (a rise
in ￿) has the opposite e⁄ect on the value of matches because it is equivalent to an increase
in the value of leisure ‘. Consequently, in contrast with models where workers do not
need to accumulate the employment time to become eligible for UI, a more generous UI
system and a more expensive one have competing e⁄ects on the vacancy-unemployment
ratio ￿: Therefore, our model is able to reconcile the sharp response of V 0; ￿; v; and u to
productivity improvements with a mild response of them to changes in b and ￿ if these
changes tend to happen together.
Depending on whether ￿rms post vacancies in equilibrium or not, and whether workers
eligible for UI quit their jobs or not, we can distinguish four possible types of equilibria:
Normal: V 0 > k ￿ V 1 ￿ 0;
Strategic: V 0 > k ￿ V 1 ￿ 0;
Phase-out: V 0 ￿ k ￿ V 1 ￿ 0;
Autarky: V 0 ￿ k ￿ V 1 ￿ 0;
where ￿ V 1 is the value of continuing the match once UI eligibility is achieved: ￿ V 1 =
16V 0 + [s=(r + s + g) ￿ ￿]^ U (Since dissolving the match is an option, the value of the
match is V 1 = max
￿
0; ￿ V 1￿
). Vacancies are posted in equilibrium if and only if the value
of a newly formed match exceeds the training costs (V 0 > k); and employed workers have
no incentive to strategically quit a job if the value of continuing the match is not exceeded
by the expected UI bene￿ts received by quitting (￿ V 1 ￿ 0): In the normal equilibrium,
both of these inequalities hold, so new jobs are created and matches survive when workers
become eligible for UI. In the strategic equilibrium, the ￿rst inequality holds but not the
second. So, new employment matches are formed, but they break down as soon as workers
become eligible for UI. Finally, in the phase-out equilibrium and the autarky equilibrium,
no new jobs are created. If the value of initial employment is positive, the worker-￿rm
pair maintains until an exogenous separation comes in the phase-out equilibrium, while
workers quit as soon as they become eligible for UI in the autarky equilibrium.
For V 0 to exceed k; the MV schedule in Figure 1 must cross the JC schedule above k:
Consequently, the parameters that shift the MV schedule up and the JC schedule down
must be su¢ ciently large relative to those that have the opposite e⁄ects. In particular,
we need that the match is su¢ ciently productive and/or UI bene￿ts su¢ ciently generous
relative to the cost of posting a vacancy, the value of leisure, UI contributions-taxes, and
training costs. For a match to survive once the worker is eligible for UI (￿ V 1 ￿ 0), the
probability of collecting bene￿ts or the present value of the bene￿ts ([s=(r + s + g)￿￿]^ U)
must be su¢ ciently low relative to V 0:
Figure 2 depicts how k and ￿ interact in the determination of the various types of
equilibria (see the Appendix for its construction). As long as ￿ V 1 ￿ 0 (￿ is su¢ ciently
low), ￿ has no e⁄ect on V 0; so the V 0 = k line is horizontal at the value ￿ k in which
this equality is satis￿ed. Once ￿ is su¢ ciently high for workers to quit upon receiving
UI eligibility (￿ V 1 ￿ 0); an increase in ￿ makes an employment match more valuable, so
the V 0 = k line is upward sloping. As long as V 0 ￿ k (k is su¢ ciently large); k has no
local e⁄ect on the value of a match, so the line (￿ V 1 = 0) is vertical at the probability ￿ ￿
in which this equality is satis￿ed. However, once k is su¢ ciently low for new jobs to be
created (V 0 > k); a reduction in k (downward shift of JC line in Figure 1) reduces V 0
17and increases ￿: As more vacancies are created, the job ￿nding rate f (￿) goes up, which
reduces the value of UI eligibility ^ U and so ^ B. Consequently, the reduction in k brings
down both the value of continuing a match (V 0+ ^ B) and the value of quitting (￿ ^ U) once
a worker is eligible for UI, so it has an ambiguous e⁄ect on the value of ￿ needed to
maintain the equality ￿ V 1 = 0: This implies an ambiguous slope for the line ￿ V 1 = 0 in the
region where V 0 > k.3
Since V 0 is guaranteed to be positive and ￿nite, and moral hazard quits are ruled
out if ￿ < s=(r + s + g); on regions in Figure 2 where the normal and the phase-out
equilibria exist are never empty. However, depending on how productive matches are and
how generous the UI system is, moral hazard quits may not happen even if ￿ = 1; in
which case there is no strategic or autarky equilibria for all admissible values of ￿:
Increasing the net productivity of a match (p ￿ ‘ ￿ ￿) or the generosity of UI bene￿ts
(a rise in b or g; or a fall in d) makes a newly formed match more valuable, so it shifts up
the V 0 = k line in Figure 2. Likewise, even if the worker is eligible for UI, the value of the
match increases with net productivity, so a rise in (p ￿ ‘ ￿ ￿) shifts the ￿ V 1 = 0 line to
the right. However, the generosity of UI bene￿ts has an ambiguous e⁄ect on the location
of this line, because a more generous UI system raises both the value of continuing the
match and the value of quitting. That is, paradoxically, increasing the generosity of the
UI system may prevent quits in some regions of the parameter space. In the region where
V 0 ￿ k, the second e⁄ect is always dominant, so if b or g rise or d falls, ￿ V 1 goes down
and the line ￿ V 1 = 0 line shifts left. However, we cannot be certain that a shift in the
same direction occurs in the region where V 0 > k:
To study the quantitative predictions of the model, we can apply the standard com-
parative statics methodology to the equilibrium system of equations (14) and (21) to
(23). Of particular interest is the elasticity of the ￿nding rate with respect to labour pro-
ductivity because it gives a good indication of the amplitude of the labor market cycles
generated by productivity shocks (see Mortensen and NagypÆl, 2007). As long as ￿ > 0,
3As depicted in Figure 2, in a neighborhood of
￿￿ k; ￿ ￿
￿
the slope of this frontier must be negative (see
Appendix).







> > > > <




(1 ￿ ￿)(r + s) + ￿f
￿ (r + s + ￿f)
+
f








(1 ￿ ￿)(r + s + g) + ￿f
￿ (r + s + g + ￿f)
+
f




if ￿ V 1 < 0:
(24)





‘ + ￿ + (r + s)k ￿ g ^ B if ￿ V 1 > 0; and
‘ + ￿ + (r + s + g)k ￿ g￿ ^ U if ￿ V 1 < 0:
(25)
In the absence of training costs and UI, the second term inside the square brackets in (24)
drops and z = ‘; so the ￿nding rate responds to changes in productivity as derived in
Mortensen and NagypÆl (2007). As Shimer (2005) pointed out, for reasonable parameter
values and a low value of leisure, this response is too small to generate the pronounced
cycles in the United States labor market. A high value of leisure, by making the pro￿ts
margin p ￿ z small, leads to a su¢ ciently large elasticity of f with respect to p to
rationalize the observed responses over the business cycle. For example, Hagedorn and
Manovskii (2007) found that when ‘ equals 0:97; model is able to generate the variance
of ￿ observed in the United States business cycles. As long as the equilibrium remains
normal or strategic, (25) implies that the pro￿t margin falls with ￿ and k; so a small
pro￿t margin may be compatible with a relatively small value of ‘ if UI contributions,
taxes, and training costs are large. However, the e⁄ect of UI bene￿ts on the pro￿t margin
works in the opposite directions. Positive UI bene￿ts also add the second terms inside
the square in (24), which further decreases the elasticity of f with respect to p:
Since p; ‘; and ￿ only enter the equilibrium system of equations (14) and (21) to (23)
in the determination of the pro￿ts margin, an increase in ‘ or ￿ a⁄ects f in the same
way as a reduction in p of the same magnitude does. Similarly, UI bene￿ts enter the
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￿ if ￿ V 1 < 0:
(26)
As pointed out in the qualitative analysis of Figure 1, a rise in bunambiguously increases
￿ and so the job ￿nding rate. As long as the increase in b does not trigger moral hazard
quits, this implies that, paradoxically, a more generous UI system reduces unemployment.
However, a move towards a more generous UI system may trigger a shift from the normal
to the strategic equilibrium in which case the level of steady state unemployment will
experience a discontinuous jump. Indeed, for the stock of unemployment to be constant,
the ￿ ows into unemployment must equal the ￿ ows out of unemployment. Denoting uss
as the steady state unemployment, we have:
(1 ￿ uss)s = ussf in the normal equilibrium, and
(1 ￿ uss)(s + g) = ussf in the strategic equilibrium.
(27)




in the normal equilibrium, and
uss =
s + g
s + g + f
in the strategic equilibrium.
(28)
Consequently, the e⁄ect of UI generosity on unemployment is non-monotonic. Even
though a rise in b reduces uss through increases in f; it may also trigger moral hazard
quits in which case the e⁄ective separation rate is s + g instead of s: The discontinuous
jump in uss predicted in this model is an artifact of workers being homogenous. With
heterogeneity, a rise in b could increase or reduce uss depending on how many moral
hazard quits it triggers.
203.2 Fully Funded UI System
If the UI system is fully funded, then using an argument analogous to the one in the
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if ￿ V 1 ￿ 0:
(30)
As depicted in Figure 3, the endogenous adjustment of ￿ to maintain the UI system
fully funded induces two di⁄erent MV schedules depending on whether moral hazard
quits occur (MVN) or not (MVS). The schedule MVN lies above MVS because moral
hazard quits are costly to the UI system, so high UI contributions need to be imposed.
Consequently, both the equilibrium value of a new match and the vacancy-unemployment
ratio are higher in a normal equilibrium relative to their counterparts in a strategic
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implies no incentive to continue.(32)













and is inversely related to V 0S and ￿
S: Therefore, if the UI system
is very generous (b; g; and ￿ are high, and d is low), then (32) is satis￿ed and (31) is
violated, so moral hazard quits occur. On the other extreme, if the UI system is very
stingy (b; g; and ￿ are low, and d is high), then (31) is satis￿ed and (32) is violated, so








; there is a generic
set of intermediate UI systems such that both (32) and (31) are satis￿ed. In which case,
two di⁄erent equilibria coexist. In one of them, workers quit once they become eligible
for UI, and in the other they do not.
The intuition for the generic multiplicity of equilibria when ￿ endogenously adjust to
maintain the UI system fully ￿nanced is the following. In the "good" equilibrium, UI
contributions are relatively low because workers eligible for UI do not quit, and workers
have no incentive of quitting because the UI contributions they have to pay if they remain
employed are low. Vice versa, in the "bad" equilibrium, UI contributions need to be large
to ￿nance the expensive UI payments since all workers quit upon earning UI eligibility,
and these workers have incentives to quit because if they remain employed, they are
burdened with large UI contributions.
Figure 4 illustrates the regions of the coexistence of the various types of equilibria
for some intermediate values of ￿: For low values of k; new jobs are created, so the
normal equilibrium may coexist with the strategic equilibrium. For high values of k;
no new jobs are created, so the phase-out equilibrium may coexist with the autarky
equilibrium. Finally, for intermediate values of k; the normal equilibrium may coexist
with the autarky equilibrium. In this case, the high UI contributions need to ￿nance the
expensive UI system not only give workers incentives to quit once they are eligible for
UI, but they also shut down the creation of new jobs.
4 Labor Cycles in Canada and the United States
This section calibrates the model to data from Canada and the United States allowing
for the value of leisure in these two countries to be as high as needed to generate a
realistic large volatility in the unemployment-vacancy ratio. In particular, we examine if
the similar labor market cycles experienced in the two countries can be generated with
reasonably similar values of leisure. This proves to be an insurmountable challenge for
the standard version of the Mortensen-Pissarides model where entitlement to UI does not
22need to be earned (see Zhang, 2008). The reason for this di¢ culty is that Canada has both
higher taxes and UI bene￿ts than the United States, which is inconsistent in those models
with the similar amplitude of the cycles experienced by unemployment and vacancies. In
the present model, taxes and UI bene￿ts a⁄ect the opportunity cost of employment in
opposite directions, so there is hope that this challenge can be met. This section also
examines if the calibrated values of leisure are neither too high for unemployment not
to be a major social concern nor too low to make the UI rules trying to prevent moral
hazard behavior nonsensical. Finally, we enquire about the response of unemployment to
increases in UI bene￿ts and taxes.
The numerical simulations in the calibration use a discrete time version of the model
analyzed in Sections 2 and 3 with the following specializations. The matching function is
assumed to be Cobb-Douglas: M(v;u) = ￿u1￿￿v￿; where ￿ is the elasticity of the ￿nding
rate with respect to the vacancy-unemployment ratio: f (￿) = ￿￿
￿: Also, consistent with
Shimer (2005), labor productivity is assumed to follow a stochastic process that satis￿es:
p = ‘ + ￿ + ey(p￿ ￿ ‘ ￿ ￿); where p￿ is normalized to one, and y is a zero mean random
variable that follows an eleven-state symmetric Markov process in which transitions only
occur between contiguous states. As detailed in the Appendix, the transition matrix
governing this process is fully determined by two parameters: the step size of a transition,
￿; and the probability that a transition occurs, ￿.
The model period in the simulations is chosen to be one month, so the real interest
rate is set to the conventional monthly rate of 0:4 percent. Even if the model period
is one month, consecutive periods are aggregated to construct quarterly series to match
empirical moments at that frequency. The calibration targets, summarized in Table 1,
aim to replicate the main rates, the labor market ￿ ows and, in a stylized way, the key
features of the taxation and UI systems in the two countries. The data sources and
methodological details in calculating these targets can be found in the Appendix.
23Table 1
Calibration Targets U.S. Canada
Monthly real interest rate (r) 0:004 0:004
Average monthly ￿nding rate (f) 0:452 0:309
Average monthly unemployment rate (u) 0:0567 0:0778
Elasticity of ￿nding rate with respect to ￿ (￿) 0:54 0:54
Average vacancy-unemployment ratio ￿ 1 1
Standard deviation of ￿ (quarterly in logs) 0:151=0:382 0:191=0:367
Standard deviation of of labor productivity (quarterly in logs) 0:020 0:021
Autocorrelation of labor productivity (quarterly in logs) 0:878 0:876
Average weeks of employment needed for UI eligibility (1=g) 20 15
Average weeks before UI bene￿ts expire (1=d) 24 33





Average tax rate inclusive of UI contributions (￿) 0:30 0:35
Ratio of training costs to quarterly wage rate (k=w) 0:55=0 0:37=0
Standard deviation of real wage w (quarterly in logs) free=0:012 free=0:016
From the labor market, the calibrations aim to replicate the standard deviation and
autocorrelation of detrended labor productivity, the average monthly ￿nding and unem-
ployment rates, the standard deviation of the vacancy-unemployment ratio ￿; and the
elasticity of the ￿nding rate with respect to the market tightness ￿. Detrended labor
productivity and the ￿nding rates were calculated using the same methodologies as in
Shimer (2005). The average unemployment rates are directly calculated using standard
data from both countries over the sample periods 1951-2003 for the United States, and
1962-2003 for Canada. The average vacancy-unemployment ratio ￿ is normalized to be
one, which implicitly de￿nes the units in which vacancies are measured and sets the value
of ￿ to be the average monthly ￿nding rate. The standard deviation of ￿ is used as the
gauge of the amplitude of the cyclical ￿ uctuations in the labor market. In the baseline
calibration, we follow Mortensen and NagypÆl (2007) and target the standard deviation
of ￿ conditional on p; recognizing in this way that productivity shocks are not the only
source of cyclical variations. However, to check how much our results depend on this
choice, we also report calibrations using the unconditional standard deviation of ￿ as the
target. Finally, the elasticity of the ￿nding rate with respect to the market tightness ￿ is
estimated using the method proposed by Mortensen and NagypÆl (2007), which uses the
24law of motion of unemployment at the steady state and sets ￿ = 0:54 in both countries
(see Appendix for details).
From the UI programs, the calibrations aim to be consistent with the average time
it takes for a worker to gain UI eligibility, the average duration of UI bene￿ts, and the
average actual replacement rates of UI bene￿ts in the two countries. In the United States,
UI eligibility takes around 20 weeks of work and the maximum duration of bene￿ts is
around 24 weeks4. In Canada, both the time needed for eligibility and the maximum
duration of bene￿ts have changed over time and currently depend on the unemployment
rate in the region of residence. The targets used in the calibration, 15 weeks to gain
eligibility and 33 weeks for the maximum duration of bene￿ts, are representative ￿gures
over the sample period56. The average actual replacement rate of UI bene￿ts is de￿ned as
the ratio of the average weekly UI bene￿ts paid to unemployed workers over the average
weekly insurable earnings paid to employed workers. As explained in the Appendix, these
rates are obtained as the product of two ratios. The ￿rst ratio is the average weekly UI
bene￿ts paid to UI recipients over the average weekly insurable earnings paid to employed
workers (b=w). The second ratio is the fraction of unemployed workers receiving UI
bene￿ts (u1=u). Finally, the parameter ￿ is interpreted not just as UI contributions but
also as a general tax, so the government is using a large fraction of ￿ to ￿nance a public
4Card and Riddell (1992) documents that in most states in 1989, UI eligibility requires 20 weeks of
work, or the earnings equivalent of 20 weeks of full-time work at the minimum wage, and the maximum
duration of bene￿ts lasted around 24 weeks. Similarly, Osberg and Phipps (1995) compares the UI
eligibility requirements across states and ￿nds that Texas (relatively less generous state) and New York
(relatively more generous state) both set 20 weeks as the minimum employment weeks to qualify in 1992.
5As to the entitlement UI weeks in Canada, under the UI Act of 1971, regular UI eligibility required
a minimum of 8 employment weeks during the base year. In 1977, the minimum employment weeks was
replaced by variable entrance requirement (VER) and increased to 10-14 weeks in 1977, then to 10-20
weeks in 1990. E⁄ective in 1997, the VER based on employment weeks was replaced by an entrance
requirement based on hours of work. The minimum hours for regular UI bene￿ts ranged from 420- 700
hours. We link these two VERs by converting hours of work to full-work weeks. For example, 420 hours
is equivalent to 10.5 weeks of full-time work.
6With respect to the maximum duration of bene￿ts, as reported in Table 4 in ￿EI Reform and Multiple
Job-Holding - November 2001￿from Human Resource and Social Development Canada, it was 32:8 weeks
in 1995, and 32:9 weeks in 1997.
The legislations regarding the UI duration are rather complicated. For example, Canada has a ￿ve-
stage bene￿ts structure. The UI duration (after 1989) depends on the previous weeks of work and
the prevailing unemployment rate in the region of residence. These complexities make it impossible to
calculate an average over the sample period.
25good, which yields separable utility to the constituents of the economy7.
The ￿nal parameter that characterizes the UI programs in our model is the probability
of collecting bene￿ts after a voluntary quit, ￿: Because of Proposition 3, this probabil-
ity is irrelevant in the determination of output, unemployment, and vacancies as long as
moral hazard quits do not occur in equilibrium. In our model with homogeneous workers,
if moral hazard quits occurred for some realizations of p; it would generate the strongly
counterfactual prediction that occasionally all employed workers eligible for UI would quit
at the same time. To avoid this prediction, we set ￿ to the maximum probability that
prevents moral hazard quits for all realizations of p: Because of Proposition 3, all prob-
abilities lower than this maximum have identical predictions for output, unemployment,
and vacancies.8
In the baseline calibration, the costs of training a worker in the United States are
targeted to match the costs reported in the 1982 Employer Opportunity Pilot Project as
fraction of the quarterly wage rate: (k=w)US = 0:55: This is the same total cost used in
Silva and Toledo (2007). In Canada, Goldenberg (2006) estimates that training costs as
a fraction of wages are around two-thirds of those in the United States, which implies
(k=w)CA = 0:37. To check how much our results depend on the presence of these training
costs, we also report calibrations without them. Finally, to determine the bargaining
weight of workers, our baseline calibration uses the Hosios rule: ￿ = 1 ￿ ￿: To check the
robustness of this choice, we also conduct a calibration where ￿ is chosen to match the
standard deviation of the real wage conditional on p:
The values of fr; ￿; ￿; ￿; ￿; g; dg follow directly from the stated targets in Table
1. The values of the remaining parameters fs; b; c; ￿; ￿; k; lg are obtained with the
following iterative procedure. First, an initial guess about the values of these parameters
is formed. Using this guess the model is simulated for a long horizon (24,000 months),
and the initial guess is then revised. This process continues until the predictions of the
7See Annex 4 (Tax Relief: Issues and Options) of "The Economic and Fiscal Update 1999" by the
Department of Finance Canada.
Website is http://www.￿n.gc.ca/update99/annex_4e.html (downloaded in Jan 2008)
8The probability ￿ does a⁄ect the real wage, and so its standard deviation. However, this e⁄ect turns
out to be fairly small in our simulations.
26model match the targets of Table 1. In this procedure, the probability of collecting UI
after a voluntary quit ￿ is set tentatively to 1. If with this probability moral-hazard quits
occur for some values of p (￿ V 1
p < 0 for all p 2 P), then it is revised downward to the
maximum value that prevents moral hazard for all possible values of p:
TABLE 2
Calibration Results
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
US CA US CA US CA US CA
Calibration targets
std(￿) 0.151 0.191 0.382 0.367 0.151 0.191 0.151 0.191
std(w) free free free free free free 0.012 0.016
k=w 0.55 0.37 0.55 0.37 0 0 0.55 0.37
Parameter Values
￿ 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.104 0.363
k 1.594 1.085 1.607 1.092 0 0 1.516 1.078
c 0.132 0.097 0.053 0.047 0.131 0.096 0.612 0.137
s 0.027 0.026 0.026 0.025 0.027 0.026 0.027 0.026
￿ 0.076 0.124 0.14 0.233 0.107 0.178 0.082 0.126
￿ 0.3 0.302 0.295 0.29 0.3 0.297 0.3 0.302
b 0.169 0.403 0.171 0.409 0.174 0.41 0.161 0.401
￿ 1 1 1 1 1 0.48 1 1









=w1 0.90 0.38 0.74 0.23 0.13 0.09 0.32 0.34
Critical l (quit to get UI) 0.80 0.57 0.73 0.56 0.54 0.45 0.70 0.58
Semi-elasticity of u w.r.t b -0.16 -0.28 -0.45 -0.57 -0.16 -0.28 -0.20 -0.29
Semi-elasticity of u w.r.t ￿ 4.48 5.51 12.89 11.44 4.50 5.59 5.85 5.71
Table 2 displays the calibration results. The upper part of the table describes the
speci￿c targets for each particular calibration. Model 1 is our baseline calibration that
targets the standard deviation of ￿ conditional on p; uses the Hosios rule to determine
the bargaining weight ￿, and incorporates positive training costs. Model 2 deviates from
model 1 by targeting the unconditional standard deviation of ￿. Model 3 removes the
training costs from the model. Finally, model 4 departs from the Hosios rule and calibrates
27￿ by targeting the conditional standard deviation of the real wage. The middle part of
the table reports the parameter values that ￿t the model to the observed target values
for the two countries. Finally, the lower part of the table shows some of the implications
for each model.
All the models are successfully calibrated to our intended targets with similar values
of leisure for the United States and Canada. In the baseline Model 1, these values of
leisure are respectively 53 and 54:2 percent of average labor productivity. The major
reason that these values are so much lower than those in Hagedorn and Manovskii (2007)
is that taxes, which are assumed to be 30 percent in the United States and 35 percent in
Canada, are a separate variable in our model. Also, as demonstrated by the calibrations
of Models 2 to 4, the value of leisure increases if the amplitude of the business cycle is
targeted to match the unconditional standard deviation of ￿; training costs are removed,
or the standard deviation of real wages is targeted instead of imposing the Hosios rule.
However, as long as the same model is used in both countries, the values of leisure in the
United States and Canada are fairly similar.
All our calibrations are consistent with the widespread social concern about unem-
ployment. For each extra worker unemployed, society as a whole loses the gap between
labor productivity and the value of leisure (p ￿ l); which in our calibrations is on average
between 40 and 47 percent of labor productivity. In addition, for each extra unemployed
worker, the cost of posting vacancies increases by c￿ (which averages c), and the cost
of training workers increases by fk. As Tables 1 and 2 imply, these turnover costs vary
widely across our simulations, but in all cases they are important. For example, in the
Model 1 calibration to data from the United States, for each extra unemployed worker,
the average extra cost of posting vacancies increases by 13 percent of labor productivity,
and the average extra cost of training workers increases by a further 72 percent of labor
productivity. Therefore, in this particular instance, the overall social costs of having an
extra worker unemployed adds up to 132 percent of the output the worker would produce
if employed.
The costs of unemployment as born by workers are reported in the ￿rst two lines
28of the lower part of Table 2. The ￿rst one of these lines reports how many months of
pay a worker who is not eligible for UI would be willing to sacri￿ce to avoid a spell of
unemployment. The second line reports the analog number of months for an eligible
worker. In the baseline Model 1, an American worker is willing to sacri￿ce 1:05 months
of pay to avoid becoming unemployed before earning UI eligibility and 0:9 months of pay
after this eligibility is earned. The analog ￿gures for a Canadian worker are 0:91 months
of pay before earning UI eligibility and 0:38 months of pay after eligibility is earned.
These costs are substantial but not catastrophic; in particular if the worker falls into the
soft safety net of the Canadian UI system. In judging these ￿gures, one must take into
account that on average a spell of unemployment lasts only 2:2 months in the United
States and 3:2 months in Canada. Also, while unemployed, the worker avoids payroll
and income taxes and assigns a signi￿cant value to the extra leisure. The main reason
that the cost of becoming unemployed remains substantial is that upon losing a job the
worker incurs a signi￿cant loss in human capital, paid in the model through the one-time
training costs. As Table 2 re￿ ects, the costs of losing a job are much lower in Model
3 where there are no training costs. They are also lower in Model 4 where the worker
appropriates a much smaller fraction of the employment-match surplus.
The design of the UI systems in Canada and the United States shows a clear concern to
avoid workers choosing to become or remain unemployed to collect UI. For example, both
systems require a long prior employment period to gain UI entitlement and terminate UI
when unemployed workers experience a long unemployment spell, which is when they
need UI support the most. Because of the homogeneity of workers, our simulations rule
out moral-hazard quits to avoid the untenable prediction that all workers entitled to
collect UI quit for some realizations of p: Allowing for su¢ cient heterogeneity to induce
moral-hazard quits for a small but signi￿cant fraction of employed workers is beyond
the scope of the present contribution. However, Table 2 (third line of the lower part)
reports the minimum critical value of leisure that a deviant worker would need to have
to quit once UI is earned assuming that the worker expects to collect the UI statutory
29replacement rate (0:4 for the United States and 0:55 for Canada) with certainty9. In the
baseline Model 1, American workers are only willing to quit to collect UI if their value
of leisure is no less than 80 percent of their labor productivity. Therefore, the concern
built in the UI system to avoid moral-hazard unemployment only makes sense if some
American workers have values of leisure not too distant from this level. In the alternative
models, these critical values of leisure are lower, but except for the model without training
costs these critical values are at least 70 percent of labor productivity. In Canada, with
a more generous UI system, the analog critical values are much lower, which is consistent
with the perception that "abusing" the UI system by some groups of the labor force is a
common occurrence in this country.
The last two lines of Table 2 report the semi-elasticities of unemployment with re-
spect to UI bene￿ts and taxes; that is, they report the average percentage increase in
unemployment if b or ￿ increases by 1 percent of labor productivity. As Proposition 2 im-
plies, if b and ￿ increase in tandem to keep the bottom line of the UI ￿nances untouched,
unemployment would not be a⁄ected. However, if only one of these variables changes, it
does have an e⁄ect on unemployment. If b increases, unemployment falls because the jobs
needed to earn UI eligibility become more attractive, so the employment-match surplus,
and therefore, the number of vacancies posted by ￿rms increase. The bulk of empirical
evidence contradicts this negative response. One could realign the model with reality by
allowing the increase in b to induce moral-hazard quits. Unfortunately, to accomplish
this without falling in the absurd prediction that once all workers eligible for UI quit,
it would require to introduce worker or match heterogeneity which is beyond the scope
of the present contribution. We leave this interesting extension to future work. If ￿
increases by 1 percent of labor productivity, unemployment increases. In the Model 1
calibration, this increase is 4:5 percent in the United States and 5:5 percent in Canada.
These semi-elasticities are higher than the values typically found in the empirical litera-
9In Canada, according to the 1955 Employment Insurance Acts and the subsequent amendments, the
statutory UI replacement rate averaged, over the period 1962-2003, 55 (60 for claimants with dependents)
percent of the average yearly insurable earnings in the qualifying period. The value of 0:4 in the United
States is from Shimer (2005).
30ture (see Costain and Reiter, 2005), which ￿nds values around 2. However, the empirical
estimates are not uncontroversial because the response of unemployment to increases in
￿ depends crucially on how the extra money collected from taxes is used. If it is used, at
least in part, to raise UI bene￿ts, then the overall responses of unemployment would be
predicted to be smaller than the elasticities reported in Table 2. Theoretically, it is easy
to perfectly control the increases in ￿ while keeping b constant, but in empirical work
it is di¢ cult to identify increases in ￿ which are uncorrelated with variables that might
a⁄ect the attractiveness of ￿nding or keeping jobs.
5 Conclusion
Once workers have to earn their entitlement to UI bene￿ts with prior employment, a
generous UI system is an additional bene￿t to an employment relationship and as such
promotes job creation. This positive entitlement e⁄ect counteracts the negative e⁄ect
derived from the high cost of ￿nancing a generous UI system. If individuals are risk
neutral, the UI system is fairly priced, and the rules of the UI system prevent moral-
hazard unemployment, then the presence and/or generosity of the UI system have no
e⁄ect on output, unemployment, and vacancies. As with Ricardian Equivalence, this
irrelevance result should be useful to pinpoint the e⁄ects of a UI system to violation
of its premises. That is, the economic e⁄ects of a UI system arise from three sources:
The insurance it provides to smooth the income ￿ uctuations experienced by risk-averse
workers. The potential ￿nancial unbalance if the UI provisions for a segment of the labor
force are subsidized or taxed. And, the potential moral-hazard e⁄ects on search behavior,
acceptance of job o⁄ers, and quit decisions.
In itself, the endogenous entitlement to UI bene￿ts as modelled in this paper does
not resolve the current debate about the suitability of the Mortensen-Pissarides model
in generating realistic labor market cycles. However, it does bring some insights into the
debate. The obvious concern to prevent moral-hazard quits in the design of the UI systems
is meaningful only if workers have a su¢ ciently high value of leisure. Also, since the
31generosity of a UI system has an ambiguous and potentially small e⁄ect on unemployment,
one can reconcile a high response of unemployment to changes in labor productivity with a
small response of unemployment to changes in UI bene￿ts. In particular, this is important
to resolve why Canada and the United States have similar labor cycles even though taxes
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366.2 Proofs in Section 2
6.2.1 Derivation of the System (14) to (17)






p from (2) to (7) into (9) and































p to obtain (17). Finally, to obtain (16), substitute (4) to
(7) into the de￿nition of ^ Bp and simplify using that because of Nash bargaining a worker
is willing to quit a job if and only if the employing ￿rm is also willing to terminate the
match.
Proof Proposition 1 For this proof, it is convenient to rewrite the system of equa-
tions characterizing an equilibrium as follows. De￿ne ￿(V 0) to be the real function that








(1 ￿ ￿)(r + s + ￿)
:
The assumed properties of the matching function imply that ￿=f (￿) is a strictly increasing
function of ￿ such that lim￿!0 [￿=f (￿)] = 0; so ￿(V 0) is well de￿ned, continuous and
increasing, and ￿(0) = 0: Therefore, ￿(V 0) has the same properties, and ￿(V 0) is positive
if and only if V 0 is positive. Using the above de￿nitions, zp = ‘+￿p and (14), the system
of equations (15) to (17) can be rewritten as:
^ Up =
b + ￿Ep ^ Up0









^ Bp = max
(
￿ ^ Up ￿ V
0
p ;
s^ Up + ￿Ep ^ Bp0










p ￿ zp + g ^ Bp + ￿EpV 0
p0
r + s + ￿
: (36)
For a set of functions fV 0
p ; ^ Bp; ^ Upg; let x 2 R3n
+ be the vector (V 0
1 ;:::;V 0
n; ^ B1;::: ^ Bn; ^ U1;:::; ^ Un),
and F (x) 2 R3n
+ be the values of fV 0
p ; ^ Bp; ^ Upgp2P on the right-hand-side of (34) to (36)
when the left-hand-side of these equations is evaluated at x:De￿ne X as the subset of
R3n
+ that satis￿es the following bounds: xi 2 [0;pi ￿ zi + b=(r + d)] for i = 1 to n; and
xi 2 [0;b=(r + d)] for i = n + 1 to 3n. The set X is non-empty, closed, bounded, and
convex. Also, using V 0 ￿ ￿(V 0) and p > zp for all p 2 P, one can easily check that
F maps X onto itself. Consequently, Brower￿ s ￿xed point theorem implies that F has a
￿xed point in X:
Given the bounds from the previous paragraph, equations (34) and (35) imply that
^ Up; ^ Bp > 0 if b > 0. Similarly, since ￿(V 0) is positive if and only if V 0 is positive,
(36) implies that V 0
p > 0. Finally, since V 1
p > 0 is equivalent to ^ Bp > ￿ ^ Up ￿ V 0
p ; and
^ Bp > s^ Up=(r + s + g + ￿) because Ep ^ Bp0 > 0: V 1
p can be guaranteed to be positive if
￿ ￿ s=(r + s + g + ￿):
6.2.2 Comparative Statics Derivations
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#￿1
if ￿ V 1 ￿ 0:
(39)
Finally, using (37), (21), (22) and ^ z in (25), and simplifying yields (24).



















= p ￿ ‘ ￿ (r + s + g)k if ￿ V 1 ￿ 0:
(40)
Therefore, the second terms inside the square brackets in (39) and the e⁄ect of UI in the
de￿nition of z drop out.
6.2.3 Existence of Di⁄erent Types of Equilibria.











r + s + g
b
r + d
￿ ￿ k if ￿ V 1 ￿ 0; and
p ￿ ‘ ￿ ￿
r + s + g
+ ￿
g
r + s + g
b
r + d
if ￿ V 1 ￿ 0:
(41)
Furthermore, if V 0 ￿ k;using (21) to (23), the condition for workers not to have incentives
to remain in their employment matches once they are eligible for UI simpli￿es with the
help of (21) to (23) into:
￿ ￿






r + s + g
￿ ￿ ￿: (42)
If V 0 > k ; for an equilibrium to be consistent with no strategic quits, it must satisfy:
￿c = f (￿)(1 ￿ ￿)(V 0 ￿ k); (21) to (23), and ￿ V 1 ￿ 0: Once the values for V 0; ^ B; and ^ U
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= p ￿ ‘ ￿ ￿ ￿ k (r + s); and (43)
s
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r + d + f (￿)
b
￿ ￿ (44)
Therefore, the V 0 + ^ B = ￿ ^ U line must satisfy (43) and (44) with equality, or, after
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r + d + f (￿)
b
Since ￿=f(￿) is increasing with ￿; (43) de￿nes ￿ as an implicit decreasing function of k:
Therefore, in Figure 2, the line ￿ V 1 = 0 has a negative slope in the region where V 0 > k if
the expression inside the ￿rst parenthesis in (43) is positive, which must be true around
the point
￿￿ k; ￿ ￿
￿
where ￿ = 0: In other regions, the slope of this line is ambiguous.









= V 0N if V 0N + ^ BN ￿ ￿ ^ UN; and
p ￿ ‘ ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿1 ￿
S
r + s + g
= V 0S if V 0S + ^ BS ￿ ￿ ^ US:
(45)
While the conditions for strategic quits to occur or not simplify into (31) and (32).
6.3 Calibration Strategy and Methodology
6.3.1 The Stochastic Process of Productivity
The random variable y takes values in a ￿nite-ordered (11 states) set of real numbers Y
de￿ned as follows:
Y = f￿5￿;￿4￿;:::;0;:::;4￿;5￿g:
where ￿ > 0 is called the step size of a transition and measures the amplitude of changes
in the cyclical component of log of labor productivity. At the beginning of each period
40(the numerical simulations use a discrete time version of the model), the value of y takes
a new value y0 with probability ￿ or stays unchanged with complementary probability.














Remark that the probability of moving up (down) is decreasing (increasing) in the current
value of y; and it is zero at y = 5￿ (y = ￿5￿), so y0 2 Y for all y 2 Y . The parameters ￿
and ￿ are calibrated to match the standard deviation and the autocorrelation coe¢ cient
of productivity (quarterly in logs).
6.3.2 Estimation of ￿
Following Mortensen and NagypÆl (2007), ￿ is estimated using the law of motion of
unemployment at the steady state: The ￿ ows out of unemployment (also the number of
successful matches) equal the ￿ ows into unemployment. Therefore, we have that
m(u;v) = s(1 ￿ u): (46)
Using the Cobb-Douglas speci￿cation of m and taking logarithms on both sides of equa-










+ 1 ￿ ￿
￿
: (47)
The empirical counterpart of @ lnv=@ lnu is the slope of the Beveridge curve, which can
be calculated regressing lnv on lnu, that is, @ lnv=@ lnu = ￿vu￿v=￿u: Combining this










+ 1 ￿ ￿
￿
(48)
41Using the data moments in Shimer (2005) and Zhang (2008) (see Table 1 in these two
papers) to calculate the left-hand side of (48) and the average unemployment rates over
the sample period (7:78 percent over the period of 1962-2003 in Canada and 5:67 percent
over the period of 1951-2003 in the United States), we obtain that the estimated value
of ￿ is 0:54 in both countries.
6.3.3 Actual UI Bene￿ts Replacement Rate
The actual UI bene￿ts replacement rate is measured as the ratio of the average weekly UI
bene￿ts paid to unemployed workers over the average weekly earnings paid to employed
workers. To calculate this ratio, we multiply the fraction of unemployed workers who
receive UI bene￿ts times the ratio of the average weekly UI bene￿ts paid to UI recipients
over the average weekly earnings paid to employed workers (see Appendix 6.4.2 and for
data sources):10
Actual UI Bene￿ts Replacement Rate, 1972-2003




Average UI bene￿ts of recipients
Average earnings of workers
Canada 0:265 0:653 0:406
U.S. 0:111 0:310 0:357
6.4 Data Sources
6.4.1 Variables in the labor market
1. Unemployment: Statistics Canada, CANSIM II, V2062814 over the period of 1976-
2005; the Historical Labor Force Statistics, Catalogue, Vol.1971-1974 over the period of
1962-1974; and Statistics Canada, Labor Force, Catalogue 71-001, Vol. 1975 for the year
1975.
2. Vacancy: Statistics Canada, CANSIM II, V3687 (1981=100) over the period of
1962-1988 and V3759 (1996=100) over the period of 1981-2003.
3. Job-￿nding rate: The job-￿nding rate is computed by equation (1) in Shimer (2005).
The data required are from Statistics Canada, CANSIM II, V2064893 and V3433878 over
10Hall (2005) argues that the replacement rate in the United States is around 10￿15 percent in recent
years.
42the period of 1976-2003; the Historical Labor Force Statistics, Catalogue 71-210, Vol.
1971-1974 over the period of 1962-1974; and Statistics Canada, Labor Force, Catalogue
71-001, Vol. 1975 for the year 1975.
4. Separation rate: The separation rate is constructed by equation (2) in Shimer
(2005). The data required are from Statistics Canada, CANSIM II, V 2064890 over the
period of 1976-2005; the Historical Labor Force Statistics, Catalogue 71-210, Vol. 1971-
1974 over the period of 1962-1974; and Statistics Canada, Labor Force, Catalogue 71-001,
Vol. 1975 for the year 1975.
5. Labor productivity: Labor productivity is measured as real output per worker
in industries excluding agriculture and public sector, 1992=100. The data source for
GDP is Statistics Canada, CANSIM II, V328916, V328932, V329123, V329126, V329144,
V329155, V329156, V329157, V329170, V329217, V329218 over the period of 1961-
1996, and V2035520, V2035521, V2035524, V2035541, V2035545, V2035549, V2035736,
V2035737, V2035738, V2035758, V2035773, V2035783, V2035794 over the period of 1997-
2003. The data source for employment is Statistics Canada, CANSIM II, V2057606,
V2057607, V2057608, V2057609, V2057611, V2057612, V2057613, V2057614, V2057615
over the period of 1987-2003; Statistics Canada, Labor Force, Catalogue 71-001, Vol.
1960-1966 over the period of 1962-1966; and the Historical Labor Force Statistics, Cata-
logue, 71-201, Vol. 1971-1974 and Vol. 1986-1987 over the period of 1966-1986.
Data on the variables listed above in the United States is from Shimer (2005).
6. Unemployment rate: In Canada, the data required are from Statistics Canada,
CANSIM II, V2062815 over the period of 1976-2003; Data over the period of 1962-1975
are calculated using the data on unemployment and employment from CANSIM II as
mentioned above. In the United States, they are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Series LNS14000000 over the period of 1951-2003.
7. Real wage: Measured as the average nominal wage per worker in all industries
divided by the implicit GDP de￿ ator. The implicit GDP de￿ ator is calculated as nomi-
nal GDP divided by real GDP. In Canada, the data required are from Statistics Canada,
CANSIM II, V500266 and V1996471 for the nominal wage, V498943 for the real GDP
43and V498086 for the nominal GDP over the period of 1962-2003. In the United States,
the data are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Series PRS85006063 for the nomi-
nal compensation, PRS85006013 for employment, PRS85006043 for the real GDP and
PRS85006053 for the nominal GDP.
6.4.2 Indicators of Generosity of Unemployment Insurance System
1. UI eligibility rate (u1=u): Measured as the ratio of the monthly number of regular UI
recipients to the monthly number of unemployment. In Canada, the data on the monthly
regular UI recipients are from Statistics Canada, CANSIM II, V384652 and V2062814
over the period of 1976-2003. In the United States, this ratio is directly calculated from
data in Table C.1 in Wayne Vroman (2004) over the period of 1967-2003.
2. UI bene￿ts replacement rate (b=w): Measured as the ratio of the average weekly
regular UI bene￿ts paid to UI recipients to the average weekly earnings paid to employed
workers on a gross basis. In Canada, the data required are from Statistics Canada,
CANSIM II, V384494 for average weekly regular UI bene￿ts, and V75249, V729405,
V1597104 for the average weekly earnings over the period of 1972-2003. In the United
States, this ratio is directly calculated from U.S. Department of Labor Employment and
Training Administration (DLETA hereafter) annual report and ￿nancial data (Taxable
and reimbursable claim, Column 33) over the period of 1972-2003. Download from the
website http://workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/unemploy/hb394.asp in July 2007.
3. Minimum employment weeks to qualify for the regular UI bene￿t: In Canada, the
data required are from Statistics Canada, Table 1 in Publication 11F0019MPE No.125
over the period of 1962-1994. After 1994, the minimum employment hours (or equiva-
lently weeks) became depending on the regional unemployment rate. According to the
relevant information from Human Resources and Skills Development Canada (see ex-
ample from http://srv200.services.gc.ca/iiws/EIRegions/toronto.aspx?rates=1), match-
ing the long run unemployment rate 7:78%, 15 weeks is picked to be the approximate
estimate. In the United States, see detailed discussion in Card and Riddell (1992) and
Osberg and Phipps (1995): Publication IN-AH-223E-11-95 from Human Resources and
44Social Development Canada (HRSDC hereafter).
4. Entitlement weeks of regular UI bene￿t: In Canada, the data required are from Ta-
ble 4 in ￿EI Reform and Multiple Job-Holding - November 2001￿released by the HRSDC.
The same estimate can be seen in Belzil (2001), "Unemployment Insurance and Subse-
quent Job Duration: Job Matching versus Unobserved Heterogeneity," Journal of Applied
Econometrics 16(5). In the United States, the data are directly calculated from DLETA,
annual report and ￿nancial data (Taxable and reimbursable claim, Column 27) over
the period 1951-2003. Download from the website http://workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/
unemploy/hb394.asp in July 2007.
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